If
we are moral because it is an imperative of our very nature, then the manner in
which we are moral needs to reflect our nature. If our morality does not reflect our nature, it is pointless,
since there is no other real basis for morality. Furthermore, morality not based on our nature is self-defeating,
since it fails to fulfill the imperative within us.
So
what is our nature?
There
are two answers to this: there is human nature in general, and there is your
own nature in particular. Each can be
very hard to pin down.
But
we don’t need to pin them down here. It
is enough, for now, to make some general observations. Then we can see how it works with a couple
of examples. Your life’s work will be
to figure out the rest from there.
Observation #1:
Morality needs to reflect the many-sidedness of human nature
We
are animals by nature, but we also have high intelligence.[1] We have instinct and visceral emotions that
we share with our animal cousins, but we also have reason and judgment that is
on a par with no other species. We are
social and loving creatures, but we also have a strong drive for our own
personal advancement and survival. We
love peace and ease, but we have a violent streak, too.
Any
moral code that does not take all such elements of our nature into account will
fail. This may seem obvious, but many
moral codes don’t even try. They place
one aspect far above another – glorifying our reason or our lovingness or our
self-sacrificing impulses while denigrating their opposites. Sure, we can admire people so narrowly
focused morally that they adopt lives of great asceticism, enforced celibacy,
or unabating service to others. But at
the same time, people who live such lives are probably themselves out of
balance, and in any case, elevating such single-minded modes of living into
moral ideals is both unrealistic and false to who we are. (Kant’s rule also works here: if everyone
were totally ascetic, completely celibate, or interested in nothing but serving
others, human society would fall apart, or even cease to exist – so such
practices are unlikely to be true moral ideals.)
If
there is one secret to morality, I might suggest that it is this: balance. We need to embrace all aspects of our nature, but since many of
them are somewhat contradictory, our great task is to keep them in
balance. Our instincts need to be
balanced by our judgment, our emotions by our reason, our selfishness by our
caring for others, our drive for perfection by a recognition of limits and of the
reality around us.
This
is less a matter of logic than of experience.
Logically, you might suppose that if you put all of your eggs into, say,
the “emotion” basket or the “reason” basket, you still have the same number of
eggs as if you split them evenly. But
if you seek out those rare people who live happy, fulfilling, productive,
involved lives, people who are loved and respected by others and who in turn
love and respect others, people wise enough to do the right thing almost all
the time and strong enough to stand up to adversity – generally you will find
that these people have striven for, and to some extent have achieved, the kind
of personal and moral balance we are considering here.
Of
course, as noted a moment ago, there is our individual nature to take into
account as well as general human nature.
Most of us are born lopsided, and raised lopsided. We tend to be either highly emotional or
highly rational, we tend to be selfish or we tend to be self-sacrificing, we
tend to be rigid about things or blasé, we tend to trust our instincts or we
tend to fear them. Ironically, many
people of high achievement – whether for good or evil – have been among the
most imbalanced emotionally and morally.
They have, in effect, taken advantage of their defects, employing their
extreme characteristics (though not always deliberately) to propel them down a
path that a well-balanced person would never explore. And as I say, sometimes such people do marvelous, good things. But if you read their biographies, you will
find that they are rarely happy and rarely feel fulfilled, regardless of what
they achieve. They typically are very
unpleasant people to live or work with – or to be.
So
you may choose that, if you wish. But
the better strategy for most people is to identify their imbalances, and to
nurture the aspects of themselves that are naturally weak, while making an
effort to rein in those that are strongest.
Such efforts will rarely be more than partially successful – which is a
good thing, actually, or else all of us would end up in the same mushy middle
ground. Our society works better
because of our differences: we need both nurses and engineers, scholars and
laborers, artists and mechanics.
In
the realm of morality specifically, perhaps we benefit from some variation as
well. People in whom self-aggrandizing
impulses are strong, for example, can be high achievers, great entertainers,
dedicated public servants. But even for
them, their personal moral code should recognize all sides of their own nature,
and all sides of human nature in general.
Otherwise their strengths will lead to immoral choices and actions. How often we see single-mindedness in
politics or war or business or even in religion or the arts eventually lead to
evil.
Building
a lopsided moral code is perverse and destructive, whether it be built, for
example, on the value of self-centeredness (such as Ayn Rand did), or on its
opposite, self-abnegation (as many religious “saints” have done). To the extent that our morality does not
represent all aspects of our human
nature, it damages ourselves and others.
And to that extent, it is immoral.
Balance is
the key.
Observation #2:
There are no absolute and universal moral rules
To
the extent that there is a biological basis in the brain for all of this, and
to the extent that the development of the brain is determined by the
interaction of genetics and environment, it would seem highly unlikely that any
moral instinct is held by everybody. In
fact, this is what we observe. Some of
us melt when we see someone cry, others find their hearts hardened. Some tend naturally to bravery, some to
cowardice. Some experience empathy
strongly, some weakly or not at all.
This
means that there is always some flux in any particular moral rule. One person may very strongly endorse a rule
that says, “Thou shalt not kill (ever),” and embrace it as an absolute. But that rule is absolute only for that
individual, and for anyone else who feels the same way. For the rest of us, it may be an ideal or a
guideline, but it is not an absolute.
Similarly,
rules may be universal by societal agreement, but then they are not morally
absolute. “Thou shalt not commit
murder,” is a rule most societies have agreed upon and intend to be applicable
to everyone. So by intention, at least,
it is universal. But it is still not
universally absolute, because some individuals accept it only conditionally,
and some not at all.
All
moral rules have limitations, therefore, in their force or their
applicability. This does not mean we should
not follow them, but it does mean that we should resist turning them into
rigid, absolute, inviolable moral laws.
Unfortunately,
as humans, we tend to do this all the time.
Part
of this is due to our rational nature. On
our good days, we do like to be rational.
We may not actually be all that rational, or even consistent, but we
sure don’t want to appear (to others or even to ourselves) as irrational or
inconsistent. So rather than act on
pure moral instinct at every turn, we concoct general rules. This is definitely helpful, up to a
point. But we also tend to overdo it,
making the rules rigid and applying them stringently where a balanced approach
would be more appropriate.
The
other reason we gravitate toward inventing absolute, universal rules is that it
makes life superficially easier. Once
we establish such rules, we don’t have to think about them, and moral decisions
are easier. So the temptation to lock
our moral rules of thumb into hard-and-fast codes of morality is almost
irresistible.
But
it is a temptation we need to resist.
The more successfully we do so, the more we enable ourselves to do the
best thing in each particular case, even though (horror of horrors!) we might
actually have to think about it with insight, sensitivity, and sound judgment.
This
is a bit of work, but again: the secret is balance, not easy, phony absolutes.
Example #1:
Every man is my brother?
There
are many times when a naturalistic, balanced approach to morality simply works
better than religion or some other absolutistic approach. One good example of this involves our
decisions about how to treat other people.
The
truth is, most if not all of us have an instinct to take better care of those
close to us than those farther away, those more closely related than those more
distantly related. Ideally, we love our families, we hold our closest
friends very dear, we are concerned about what happens to other
people we know more casually, we root for
people from our town or state or country, and we have a generic sort of compassion for people far away who have no real
connection to us. This is all perfectly
natural.
It
is more than natural, though – it is both practically and morally necessary
that the obligation decrease as the distance increases. It is practically necessary because we
simply can’t give equal attention to everyone in the world. It is morally necessary, because most of us
would consider someone to be wicked (or at least seriously misguided) rather
than saintly if he treated everyone the same – if, for example, he gave away
everything he had to the distant poor and ended up depriving his own children
of adequate food, education, and medical care in the process.
So
caring for people in proportion to their closeness is natural, practical, and
moral. But it is very difficult to
express this in the form of a commandment.
Religious doctrines, in fact, usually end up in the opposite camp,
teaching us platitudes like “every man is your brother.” Yet in real life, such teachings are rarely
taken seriously. The byword is,
“charity begins at home, brother.” Even
Jesus recognized the essential truth of the more nuanced, balanced doctrine:
when he was being soothed by Mary Magdalene using expensive oils that might
have instead been sold to benefit the poor, he defended her wastefulness by
pointing out that “the poor are always with us,” in contrast to himself, who
was there now and needed soothing.
The
religious platitudes are simply wrong.
They make great sound bites, but they are unnatural, impractical and, if
taken literally, immoral.
If
you haven’t noticed it yet, though, consider how natural, in evolutionary
terms, this instinct to take care of those closest to us is. To put it in simplest terms, those closest
to us share more of the same DNA with us than those who are more distant, so
the more we care for and aid those closest to us, the more we perpetuate our
own DNA. From the standpoint of
evolution, this makes all the sense in the world, so any inclination that our
ancestors had in this direction would tend to be replicated, while its opposite
would tend to fail and die out.
There
is no suggestion here that either Mother Nature or we ourselves have to be
conscious that this is what is going on.
Quite to the contrary, our moral instinct to treat our closest relatives
and friends best is there because it works, and it works whether we know why it
works or not. Yet it is remarkable –
and probably not coincidental – that for most of us, our natural instinct to
help (and even sacrifice for) others is largely in proportion to their genetic
relationship to us: immediate family most, more distant family less, unrelated
people and foreigners least.[2]
At
the same time, we have to keep our balance,
and not give these instincts free rein.
One ill effect of our natural tendency to care less about those farthest
and most different from us is the tendency to disparage, demonize, or destroy
those least like us, which has led to racism, genocide, wars of aggression, and
other abominations. We need to think
sensibly and wisely if we want to nullify these dark tendencies. We need to let our reason balance our
instinct. And when we apply it that
way, the naturalistic approach is more moral than an absolutistic religious
one.
Example #2:
Abortion
Feelings
are so strong on this subject that it’s tempting to leave it untouched. But it is worth getting into, to show that a
naturalistic approach to morality can deal sensitively even with hard issues –
and perhaps better than a religious approach can.
Before
we dive right in, though, let’s consider something else – another way in which
our instincts may lead us astray, and need to be balanced.
Our
senses are perhaps less powerful than some other animals’, but even so, they
are picking up a lot of information most of the time. Apparently, it is easier for the brain to deal with all of this
data if it can categorize things. So
anything that seems to be a rock is a rock, and we can deal with it that way
without giving a lot of thought to what makes it different from other rocks,
unless we have the leisure and inclination to do so. When a wild boar is charging us, the fact that it’s a rock is
good enough – and anything more in the way of sub-classification or ambiguity
could be a deadly waste of time. As
long as we can tell the rock from a clump of dirt, that’s all we need at a
critical moment. So this is a useful
category.
This
way of looking at the world – by categories – is so natural and commonplace
that Plato thought that everything fell into such categories (which he called
“Ideas”) and that they had some kind of existence that, if anything, was more
real than the world we perceive around us.
We might not all be inclined to take it that far, but we do like to
identify things, name them, and pigeon-hole them. It’s the way humans tend to think.
But
hard-and-fast categories can lead us astray.
A rock is not always distinct from a clump of dirt. Some rocks are soft, and some clumps of dirt
are hard. Or to take another example,
we all know the difference between a stool and a chair (a chair has a back),
but what if you made a stool with just a very slight rim around the back side
of it to make it a little less likely that someone would slide off – would that
make it a chair? Exactly how high would
the rim have to be before it was no longer a stool, and now a chair? Obviously, the answer is arbitrary. In the end, this is true of virtually all
categories.
We
need to recognize that our categories are, for the most part, matters of
convenience. There is no actual reason
to think that there is some sort of “chairness” or “rockitude” that exists out
there in a cosmic reality-land (sorry, Plato).
We see things the way we see them in part because our brains and senses
are built that way, and in part for arbitrary but convenient reasons of our
own. So when it comes to classifying
things that do not fall clearly into a category, there is usually not a right
and wrong decision about whether they belong.
Instead, it is more a matter of individual decision or group consensus
whether they belong to this category, that category, a new category, or no
category.
The
abortion controversy involves that kind of situation.
The
religious opposition to abortion is based on equating abortion to murder. Fetuses are innocent humans, killing
innocent humans is murder, therefore abortion is murder – and therefore it is
impermissible, period.
This
is a classic example of forcing an ambiguous situation into a particular
category, and using universal, absolute moral rules to evaluate it.
However,
a similar thing happens on the other side of the debate. Some “choice” advocates consider that
fetuses are a part of the woman’s body, a woman has an absolute right to do
whatever she wants with her body, therefore a woman has an absolute right to
have an abortion. Similar mental
attitude, opposite conclusion.
If
people relied on their instincts, though, rather than on absolutistic
doctrines, they would probably come out more in the middle of this dispute.[3]
What
we know is that immediately after conception there is a unique human cell. That says less than it appears to say,
though. Every human cell is unique, and
in principle (though not yet in practice), any living human cell could be
developed into a separate human being.
So the difference between a fertilized egg and an unfertilized egg or
even an ordinary cell is not very great, from a biological point of view. From there the cell grows bit by bit until
eventually you have an embryo, and then a fetus, and then a separate person. So at just what point does this cell become
a person?
If
you believe that people have souls that are somehow distinct from their bodies,
then one “answer” would be that the budding individual becomes a person when
the soul appears (or separates itself from the parent-soul, if one supposed
that it worked that way).
Unfortunately, we know much less about this than we do about the
biological aspects of reproduction – in fact, as we discussed earlier, there is
no reason to believe that a soul exists at all, so any talk of “when and how”
is a bit silly. But the point is, even
if souls existed, they wouldn’t help us answer the question.
Indeed,
the right question is not even, really, when does the cell or fetus become a
person, because it is not always murder to end the life of a person (it may
always be regrettable to some degree, but it might also be legitimate or even
morally right in some circumstances).
So the question is not just the difficult one of whether or when a fetus
is a person, but rather the even more difficult one of whether and when a fetus
is a person deserving of protection from abortion.
The
answer is: there is no objective answer.
Believing in one is a great example of taking an ambiguous case and
trying to make it definite. In reality,
of course, we need a definite answer, so that the practice of abortion can be
appropriately regulated. But that is a
practical matter that can be subject to a practical compromise. The real question we are dealing with here
is: what is the theoretically morally correct answer? And that answer is, by its nature, ambiguous and frankly
arbitrary.
God
does not define what a person is, the Bible certainly does not define what a
person is (that is, it doesn’t even try, whether it is the Word of God or not),
nor does the universe somehow define what a person is. We define what a person is, and we
more specifically define who is a person worthy of protection against
death. Since these definitions are our
doing and no one else’s, whatever we say, in our collective conscience, is what
the “right” answer is.
If
we go by our instincts rather than by our cherished doctrines, most of us do, I
think, end up somewhere near the middle.
We do recognize that in an ideal world it would be undesirable to snuff
out a fetus’s life. A fetus near to
being born resembles a person strongly enough that we feel it should be
protected except in the most extreme circumstances. And since embryos are on their way to becoming fetuses, it is
highly desirable to protect them, too.
At
the same time, we recognize that the world is not ideal. Carrying a child can be an enormous burden
for a woman, more so if she is in a vulnerable medical, psychological,
financial, or family/social situation.
Having to raise the child can be even a greater burden, especially if
the woman is facing the prospect of doing so alone. Weighing these burdens against the rights of an embryo that has
no expectations and perhaps not even any physical feeling, most of us would
intuitively say that the embryo loses out.
It is alive, and it is composed of human cells, but it is no more
entitled to protection than, say, a damaged finger that needs to be amputated
(even though it, too, is alive and is composed of human cells).
So,
do we draw a line somewhere? We could –
if we could only agree on where. Birth
seems rather late, conception rather early, though some people would argue for
either. Anyplace in between seems
arbitrary. Where some of us would like
to draw the line, perhaps, is the point at which the fetus becomes
conscious. But this too is arbitrary,
and we have no way of knowing when it occurs anyway.[4]
Part
of the political/social problem here is that we are not dealing with raw
instinct, but with moral sensibilities that change and are influenced by our
environment. The great thing is that as
human culture advances, it tends to become more sensitive and expansive in its
recognition of the interests of others.
Although we still care more about those closest to us than those farther
away, for instance, we see distant people on television starving or suffering
from earthquake damage, and we feel real sympathy, and sometimes are moved to
help them. This is a moral advance.
Likewise,
we increasingly acknowledge the rights of others. Over the last century or two, we have become much less tolerant
of oppression against people of other races, against women, against the poor,
against immigrants, against children, against homosexuals; we have even become
less tolerant of abuse of animals.
Ironically
(in political terms), the anti-abortion advocates are taking a “liberal”
position in this process. They are
trying to make sure that a borderline class of individuals (fetuses and
embryos) is inside rather than outside the definition of protected
creatures.
But
doubly ironically, the pro-choice advocates are also taking a “liberal”
position, making sure that the rights of women are protected, particularly
early in pregnancy.
This
is not really the conservative vs. liberal battle it is usually made out to be.
Rather it is one kind of liberalism
against another. And neither side seems
to be all that happy about it.
It
can’t be rewarding for most religious believers to confront the notion that
hundreds of thousands of “persons” they want to protect end up dead. Nor is it rewarding for a young woman to
have an abortion that, apart from being an unpleasant surgical procedure, ends
the possibilities of what might have been, both for herself and for the
potential future child.
If
we follow our natural instincts and the increasingly open-hearted inclinations
of our civilization, we will throw off the unjustifiable doctrines that push
toward absolute rights of one party over another. Instead, we will see abortion for what it is: a hard situation
where either choice may bring pain and harm.
And seeing it that way, perhaps we can work toward balanced answers that
minimize the suffering, even if our preconceived categories of thought have to
yield.
The
final point, for now, is that this is our decision – as individuals, and
as a society. There is no objectively
right answer. We define our own terms:
when a rock is no longer a rock, when a stool becomes a chair, and when a
fertilized egg becomes a person whose rights take precedence over its
mother’s. There is no right answer out
there to be discovered, or to be read out of the mind of God. We choose who and what we embrace, and when.
The
right decision, therefore, lies in whatever consensus we can achieve, in our
love and sensitivity to each party, and in our inevitably fallible attempts to
discern, in various circumstances, where the balance of good lies. If
there were a fixed formula for this, it would be easy. But in naturalistic ethics, there is no
fixed formula, and so it is not easy.
Nor will it be resolved socially and politically until we are inspired
by caring and love (that notion Jesus was so devoted to) instead of absolutism
and legalism (which Jesus abhorred and rejected).
But
who ever listens to him?
return to
Table of Contents
© 2006 by
C.S. Yanikoski, Harvard, Massachusetts
[1] Let’s give each
other the benefit of the doubt here.
[2] Our caring for
spouses and friends – though they may not match us genetically – does not
disprove this observation so much as expand it. Our mutual relationships with such persons help both us and our
offspring survive, so these relationships, too, offer a survival advantage for
our own DNA.
[3] The U.S.
Supreme Court decision on the subject, remarkably, did just this. It acknowledged that both sides of the
argument and both parties in an abortion had a legitimate stake, saying that
when the fetus was clearly not able to live on its own (first trimester) it
could be considered part of the woman’s body and her rights prevail, and when
the fetus was clearly able to live on its own (last trimester) then it should
be considered an independent person whose own rights would prevail, and that
during the ambiguous in-between period the sensibilities of each locality
(state) could decide which way to go.
Although this decision is often viewed as pro-abortion, it is actually
straight down the middle.
[4] Brain activity
can usually be detected at about 6 weeks after conception. Response to external stimuli, however, so
far is not detectable until about 28 weeks.
In neither case do we know if there is any consciousness.